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Developing a management control system that will meet
the needs of the government and its contractors has been
a difficult task, particularly in shipbuilding. Only two
Supervisors of Shipbuilding, SUPSHIPS Bath and Groton,
have been involved with the implementation of the Cost/
Schedule Control Systems Criteria on a major shipbuilding
contract. The approach taken by each was quite different,
and both differed from the NAVSEA suggested approach.
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The purpcse of this thesis is to describe a standard for
approaching implementation of the C/SCSC as they are applied
to the shipbuilding industry. Ihis standard, in the form of
skills and training required, will be that proposed by the
Joint Logistics Commanders in the Joint Implementation Guide
£Ref. 1] augmented by additional skills of particular
importance to the Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) in
administering a C/SCSC contract under the Department of
Defense policy of "Engagement." Against this standard, a
description and analysis will be conducted of the
alternative organizational approaches and skills utilized by
those SUPSHIPS who are presently involved. In addition,
some suggestions are offered lor Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) and SUPSHIPS who are about to become administrators
of a major defense contract. These suggestions are not
advanced as instant cures for the problems, but as ideas to
be considered and discussed in the hope that previous
mistakes and difficulties are not needlessly repeated. In
that respect, perhaps this thesis will serve as a "pass down
the line" document among the SUPSHIPS.
It is also important at the outset to discuss what
accomplishment is not intended. No checklist will be
provided for Supervisors of Shipbuilding in establishing
their organizations and preparing for a major contract
containing a requirement for C/SCSC f nor is any panacea .
DODI 7000.2 and C/SCSC are used interchangeably.

presented for problems related to the implementation of
Department of Defense Instruction 7000.2 in the contract
administration arena. It is true that at the beginning,
some hope was entertained that such a checklist could be
presented which would be suitable for use by all SUPSH1PS.
In the course of the investigation which followed, it became
evident that wide variances exist in the size of SUPSHIPS
and in the size, number, and complexity of the contractors
with whom each must work; thus precluding such a checklist.
B. SCOPE
The study herein, pertains only to the Supervisor of.
Shipbuilding and parent Naval Sea Systems Command
organizations. No attempt was made to include Army, Air
Force, Naval Plant Representative Office (NAVPRO) , or
Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS) in the
investigation, because sufficiently strong feelings exist in
the shipbuilding business, that "shipbuilding is different,"
and therefore, what other services have done is not directly
applicable. Restricting the subject to the SUPSHIPS
eliminates this somewhat emotional barrier to acceptance of
offered suggestions.
The problem of C/5CSC implementation will be approached
from several sides. ' First, the organizational framework
within which the 5UPSHIP operates will be compared with the
organizational requirements inherent in C/SCSC. Then skill
and training levels required will be contrasted with those
currently available at the SUPS4IPS. Additionally, NAVSEA's
role will be examined along the same lines to determine how
it could improve contract administration through improved
policy guidance.
To look at C/SCSC in a vacuum would be to dismiss other
important related factors. To avoid this pitfall, the
approach taken will be broadened to include the current
Department of Defence policy of "Involvement," and Navy
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Procurement Directives (NPD's) related to cost monitors,
overhead monitors, and subcontract surveillance which, along
with DODI 7000.2, support that policy.
Other organizations, suet as NAVPRO's and DCAS, were
guestioned, but only to the extent that was necessary to
prove to the author that those organizations are
"different." No attempt was made to substantiate the
significance of tne differences.
The CCAS is not ordinarily involved with the prime
contractor on a major contract. This is not to say that
DCAS does not get involved with C/SCSC, for it does, but for
the most part only at. the level of major subcontractors who
have a flow-down C/SCSC requirement. Reference 2. describes
how the CCAS organization operates to comply with DODI
7000.2.
The NAVPRO's are involved with major prime contractors
in the aerospace field and have been working with C/SCSC for
considerably longer than have the SUPSHIPS. Appendix A,
which shows contractors and programs with validated C/SCSC
systems, indicates that eighty-two of the ninety-three
validations are held by these aerospace contractors and that
none are held by shipbuilding contractors. Even so,
interviews with two NAVPRO's left the author with the
feeling that those organizations had not settled with any
common workable organization. They seemed to be in the
trial and error mode, looking for the proper mix of talent
and the proper place in the organization for such a body to
best cope with the increased involvement of DODI 7000.2.
11

C. DESIGN 01 INVESTIGATION
This' investigation grew out of questions proposed by
SUPSHIP ELEVEN in San Diego, California to the author during
a visit in Jane 1974. At that time SUPSHIP ELEVEN, working
with National Steel and Shipbuilding Co. (NASSCO) , was about
to become involved with tne Sea Control Ship contract which
included a requirement for CSCSC. The questions asked were
in the following vein: "What does this clause requiring the
implementation of DODI 7000.2 really mean? What types and
numbers of people mast I acquire to do the requirement
justice? How does DODI 7000.2 relate to other requirements
placed on me by Navy Procurement Directives (NPD) ?" These
and other questions on the subject formed the basis of this
investigation. A search of the instructions, documents, and
guidance available to the SUPSHIP left the questions largely
unanswered.
The next step was a series of letters and telephone
calls to NAVSEA to determine what information was available
and to ascertain who else had been involved in
implementation of C/SCSC. At that time only SUPSHIP Bath
and SUPSHIP Groton were administering contracts requiring
CSCSC and of the two, Bath was closest to completion of its
implementation and was nearing final validation. Since no
documented information existed which showed how SUISHIPS
Bath and Grcton were actually attacking the problem, it was
decided that a trip to each was necessary to gain tne
information through on-site interviews. Nearly all persons
interviewed agreed that the problem was a real one and that
the questions remained valid despite the progress which thoy
had made.
Bath, being furthest along, was visited first and
interviews were conducted with the Supervisor; Department
Heads of Planning, Contracts, and Production Management; the
New Construction Project Officer; and all personnel
previously cr presently assigned to the Business Eeview
12

Staff (BRS) . At Groton the Business Review Staff (locally
referred to as the Operations Support Group) was
interviewed.
Finally, to gain insight as' to the performance of the
SUPSHIPS and the expectations and guidance of NAVSEA a trip
to Washingtou was made. At NAVSEA the preponderance of time
was spent interviewing members of the Contractor Performance
Division (NAVSEA 054) , whose task it is to implement DODI
7000.2 within NAVSEA. Further, this office arranged
interviews with several other offices in NAVSEA which were
involved with manpower, training, and specific projects
related to C/SCSC. These offices included the SUPSHIP
Management Division .(NAVSEA 074; , the SSN 688 project office
(PMS 393), Irident project office (PMS 396), and the Patrol
Frigate project office (PMS 399)
.
It might seem less difficult and more direct to have
gleaned the information on organizational structure and
responsibilities from the organization manuals of these
Vctiious cofu uiaijus i nowever, J.t must be rememjjereQ tuat none
of the field activities had completed validation, thus,
there was reason to believe that organization manuals were
not indicative of the final outcome of trials and errors
made. As it turned out, this was in fact the case.
Additionally, the interviews were useful in determining what
future distribution of responsibility was intended, as
opposed to what was currently in existance, and to what
extent problems had been encountered.
The result of these interviews is an integrated look at
the triad of government offices involved with administration
of a major contract containing C/SCSC, the SUPSHIP, the







The "Engagement Concept, " is the policy which makes
widespread use of C/SCSC possible. Evolved through the late
sixties, this concept was formalized as policy in 1970 by
the Secretary of the Navy. In essence this "Engagement
Concept" (or Involvement Concept as it is often called)
implies icplementation of an aggressive Contract
Administration Service (CAS) policy based on sound knowledge
of the contract and the contractor. [Kef. 3,4]. It came as
a result of the realization that a contractor is paid to
manage his program and should be both reguired and allowed
to do so. At the same time the government has an obligation
to be prudent in the expenditure of public funds, thus
requiring it to know just how these funds are being spent
and what, in terms of product or progress, is being
realized. The Chief of Naval Material amplified the policy
by requiring vigilant review of contractors who were
essentially sole-sources or who did a substantial portion of
business with the DOD or who otherwise were not subject to
the economic discipline of the open marketplace [fief. 5].
The concept requires CAS personnel to become
familiar enough with their contractor to be able to
determine the effject of a single decision on the
contractor's total performance. To accomplish this requires
CAS personnel to become intimately familiar with tae
contractor, his organization, personalities, systems and his
thinking. It does not imply government management of
contractor affairs, but rather implies a close
over-the-shoulder look at what the contractor is doing.
14

Furthermore, to think line the contractor, CAS personnel
must have access to the same information upon which the
contractor bases his actions and decisions.
A subsequent policy directive, DODI 5000.1,
reiterates the Engagement Concept for all DOD components,
and as will be shown, requires a system like the
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria be used as one way to
implement the concept.
2. Evolution of C/SCSC
As early as 1950-51 the Department of Defense
recognized the need for improved methods of controlling
costs and of determining program progress. This recognition
lead to several innovative systems or methods from the
various agencies and from the programs within those
agencies. Among the first was the Navy developed Program
Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) . Because PERT was
developed by and associated with a program considered to be
very successful (Polaris) , it gained popularity and acclaim
in military circles. Subsequently, PERT grew to have
several modifications, such as PEBT/TIHE and PERT/COST, each
an attempt to better understand program cost, schedule, and
performance. Through the fifties and into the sixties, PERT
dominated the scene of management information techniques;
however, it was not without its faults. As each agency
implemented PERT or a variation thereof, there grew a
proliferation of status reports from each based on different
agency requirements and in different formats. Further, many
contractors were unwilling to sacrifice their own internal
management techniques evolved over many years. This
frequently lead to the establishment of "PERT cost groups,"
whose purpose it was to transpose data from the contractor's
management system into PERT formats. The process was costly
and resulted in some data being lost or made untraceable in
the transposition. Particularly complex was the situation
where one contractor nad to transpose to several different
15

PERT formats imposed by different government agencies.
In October 1965 a working group consisting of
representatives of the three military departments and staff
offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was
formed to review existing systems and develop a framework
for an integrated management information system which would
satisfy the cinimum requireients of program management; cost
estimating, funds management, and program status.
Because of dissatisfaction with PEET a decision was
made by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
that DOD should get out of the business of management
systems design and should rely on the contractor's internal
management systems. This necessitated some assurance that
all contractors would integrate their data about some common
baseline and that the contractors' systems would be
effective for government management purposes. The Director,
Defense Research and Engineering developed the common
baseline in the foru of a standard work breakdown structure
(published later as Military Standar d-88 1
.) The assurance
of effectiveness was addressed through a set of criteria
which were made a requirement in 1967 through DODI 7000.2,
"Performance Measurement for Selected Acquisitions." The
criteria were named tne Cost/Schedule Control Systems
Criteria (C/SCSC) and were evolved from the Air Force Cost
Schedule Planning and Control System (C/SPCS) . For the
purposes of this thesis it is important to note that the
basis for these criteria and MIL-STD-881 was the Air Force
experience over several years with aerospace contractors.
In 1972 DODI 7000.2 was revised and reissued to comply with
the higher order DCD Instruction 5000.1, which speaks in
even greater depth to the policy of managing cost along with
performance and schedule [Ref. 6,7].
Since its issuance in 1971, DODI 5000.1 has been the
DOD policy document for major system acquisitions. Without
referring to C/SCSC by name, it directs the use of
management systems which provide information essential to
16

efrective project management. The criteria described
include: "...information should be generated from data
actually used by contractor operating personnel..., in
summarized form..., a single, realistic work breakdown
structure..., contractor management information systems, and
reports emanating therefrom, shall be utilized to the
maximum extent practicable. .. :I This is in fact a
description cf C/SCSC in the primary DOD policy document,
and as such, constitutes recognition of C/SCSC as a highly
useful technique for implementing the Engagement Concept
[fief. 8].
The objectives of DODI 7000.2 are:
" To provide an adequate basis for responsible
decision-making by both contractor management and
DOD Components, contractors' internal management
control systems must provide data which (1) indicate
work progress, (2) properly relate cost, schedule,
and technical accomplishment, (3) are valid, timely,
and auditable, ana (4) supply DOD managers with
information at a practicable level of
summarization,
"
while using the contractor's management control systems.
The essence of the instruction is that it sets forth a
criteria for judging the effectiveness of such systems. No
new system is required, nor are any reports required. For
this reason C/SCSC will differ in every company in which it
is implemented. This' is a critical point to the contract
administrator for it makes it clear that to be effective he
must understand his contractor's systems. He can call on no
expert to quickly evaluate his situation. C/SCSC is only as
valuable as the administrator's knowledge of his contractor
is thorough.
DOD Instruction 7000.2 "Performance Measurement for
Selected Acquisitions," April 25, 1972.
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The government utilizes C/SCSC to gain the required
visibility into a contractor's operations, through a
three-phase process; Implementation, Surveillance, and
Analysis.
NAVSEA and SUPSHIP experience since the PF contract
was awarded to Bath Iron Works in April 1972, has been
associated primarily with the Implementation phase. Three
years later, no shipbuilder has yet become involved to any
significant extent in the latter two phases. While the
intent of C/SCSC is to use existing contractors' systems
without chance, except where necessary to meet the criteria,
experience to date indicates that the systems used by
shipbuilders do not meet the criteria and do require
substantial modification. The fact that the criteria were
developed with the aerospace industry in mind may account in
part for the difficulties encountered by shipbuilders in
implementation when contrasted with the widespread success
enjoyed by aerospace firms and their contract
administrators. Nevertheless, implementation has bean an
arduous process and a real bone of contention between
contractor and government where ships are involved.
The Implementation Phase consists of a series of
reviews (See Fig. 1. for a pictorial display of the
relationship between C/SCSC phases and reviews.) The first
is a Pre-award Evaluation consisting usually of a
presentation by the contractor of the systems he proposes to
use to satisfy the requirements outlined in the Hequest For
Proposal (RFP.) The objective of this evaluation is to gain
assurance that all parties fully understand that which is
required by the criteria, and to determine in gross terms




























As soon as possible after the contract is awarded,
an Implementation Review is performed. This review looks
closer at the contractor's proposed systems, systems
designs, data, and reports. Systems already in operation
are examined in-depth and discrepancies are noted. The
visit provides an early dialogue with the contractor to
identify problem areas and to establish a schedule for
subsequent reviews.
The third review is actually a series of Readiness
Reviews. Here progress is evaluated and contractor systems
traced through in great detail. These Readiness Reviews
provide further familiarization with the systems in use and
provide a last chance for tne contractor to make adjustments
and refinements before final review. An individual system
successfully demonstrated during Readiness Reviews may be
conditionally validated, the condition being that the system
continue to work properly when integrated with all other
systems.
Lastly, a final Demonstration Review is conducted.
All systems are measured, separately and as integrated parts
of a whole, against the C/SCS Criteria. Complete systems
descriptions, documentation and reports are provided to the
government for scrutiny. A successful demonstration earns
the contractor a validated system and a Memorandum of
Understanding that his systems meet the needs of the DOD.
The need for subsequent reviews to satisfy other DOD
components 01 for other contracts is obviated.
The entire review process constitutes an orderly yet
increasingly detailed look at the contractor, his
philosophies, and his methods. These management systems,
once demonstrated/validated, provide a common source of data
and a common methodology through which both government and
contractor can control funds, estimate costs, and interpret
program status [Ref. 7].
The team which conducts these reviews at a
shipbuilding contractor is uade up of personnel from
20

Headguarters. Naval Material Command (NAVMAT) / NAVSEA,
SUPSHIP, and the Defense Contract Auditing Agency (DCAA)
.
NAVMAT, wno has final authority within the Navy to approve a
contractor's system, participates in all but the fieadiness
Beviews, and provides the Team Director, a GS 16 Business
and Industrial Specialist. NAVSEA participates in all
reviews and provides a GS 15 Business and Industrial
Specialist as Team Chief, along with two or three other
similar specialists at tae GS 15/14 level. The SUPSHIP
participates in all reviews utilizing whatever talent he has
available. DCAA also participates in all reviews and
provides as necessary from one to six or eight auditors.
Interviews with NAVSEA personnel indicated that NAVMAT and
NAVSEA fairly well dominate during tne first two reviews,
with SUPSHIP personnel "catching-up" and achieving greater
participation during readiness and final demonstration
reviews.
To better understand exactly what this team does
during the various reviews during implementation, it is
necessary to look first at the C/SCS Criteria. Appendix F,
an extract from the Joint Implementation Guide, describes
the thirty-five criteria and serves as the checklist used by
team members during a contractor review. This checklist
shows what must be demonstrated and some of the specific
guestions which must be verified by team members.
Knowing wnat reviews are conducted and what
guestions are addressed during the reviews, there remains
the guestion of what skills are needed by team members to
fully comprehend the criteria and the shipbuilder's systems.
The criteria are flexible and allow for substantial
interpretation and judgement. The Joint Logistics
Commanders, including the Chief of Naval Material, set down
standards of skill and knowledge necessary to the successful
implementation of C/SCSC. They are as follows:
Technical content of the contract - Knowledge of tae
specific requirements of the contractual document including
21

the intent and reasoning behind individual clauses and
specifications.
Engineering design and test requirements
Particularly true with design and development contracts, the
team must have an understanding of what it is that is being
designed, even when the object is still in its conceptual
stage. One must understand the engineering processes used
to bring a concept to reality and hardware and how test
requirements are established as criteria for measuring
progress.
Industrial engineering and production control - One
must understand the methods used in production and
understand tne inherent efficiencies and disadvantages of
these methods. He must be able to relate the methods being
utilized to an actual time schedule and be aware of the
int erdependencies of the various elements of the production
process as they relate to cost and schedule.
Accounting or auditing - One must be able to
understand the contractor's accounting system including his
accumulation and allocation of costs of labor and materials
for a given contract and plantwide allocation of indirect
costs. Additionally he must understand contractor internal
controls designed to safeguard assets.
Program planning and control - One must understand
time and cost budgeting, the methods by which the contractor
plans his work and what systems are used to provide feedback
as measures cf conformance to original plans.
Cost and Price analysis -The ability is needed to
independently price work packages and to measure accuracy
and adequacy of contractor costs and allocated budgets in
order to determine the adequacy of budget baselines.
Contract negotiation and administration - One must
know in both an informal sense and in a legal sense how the
contract was arrive! at and how changes to it will be
handled. A Knowledge of how the contractor subcontracts for
parts of the system must be understood.
22

The af f or ementioued skills represent the skill
standard outlined by NAVMAT. There is one area not covered
by this standard but which is of vital interest in
shipbuilding. Ships by their very nature are the most
complex of weapon systems, usually requiring the integration
of several lesser but still major systems, such as guns,
missiles, torpedoes, and aircraft. This complexity togetner
with the fact that building a ship is more of a construction
problem than a production or assembly problem, heightens the
need for knowledge in material control systems. Added to
the list of required skills should be: Material control
systems - A knowledge of the contractor methods of
determining material requirements, purchasing, storing, and
material allocation, to include both contractor furnished
and government furnished materials.
In the area of training, the Guide sets a standard
that "All members should receive specialized training
dealing with management control system concepts, and
performance requirements and interpretation prior to
participation as team members." Specifically, the training
necessary includes study of work breakdown structures in
accordance with MIL-STD-881 , an in-depth analysis of the
Criteria and interpretation of the Criteria conducted within
a framework established by DOD policy, the functions of
planning and control systems for both research and
development and production type contracts in terms of
budgets planned, measurement against the plan, and actual
costs as viewed by both contractor and government. The
study should also include techniques of sampling and methods
of analysis which are necessary for determining the extent
of compliance of a contractor's systems. Aside from
criteria and methods of implementation, training is needed
on actual management systems to enaole future team members
to zero in on Key .control points in a system and points
where interdependencies are established making one system
sensitive to elements of another system. Team members must
23

thoroughly understand the concept of the budget baseline as
used in C/SCSC, including budgeted cost of work scheduled
and budgeted cost of work performed.
With this as a training standard, the Guide
recommends the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFiT)
course, "Evaluation of Performance Measurement Systems."
This three week course looks in-depth at the criteria and
interpretations thereof, and then uses about one-half of its
class time in problem solving with management systems [Ref.
9]. While this course does not attempt to impart the
functional skills required, it does present fully the
necessary skills and knowledge specifically related to
C/SCSC. As such, it satisfies the standard for C/SCSC
training. The functional expertise must be acquired by
experience and schooling through courses availaDle for each
of the respective disciplines.
Although the Navy does not yet offer a course on
C/SCSC, there are several courses offered by the Air Force
and Army en specific aspects of the criteria. AFIT offers a
two week course addressing the surveillance function and the
Army Management Engineering Training Agency offers a two
week course on the analysis function. In addition the
Defense Systems Management School offers two shorter
overview courses for middle and higher level managers. The
recommended three-week course at AFIT is the only one
available which concentrates on the implementation function
and the review process. The course not only addresses the
training skills required, but also well-serves a contract
administrator during surveillance. (See Appendix B for a
list of C/SCSC schools available.)
The last two phases of C/SCSC, Surveillance and
Analysis are less complex. The Surveillance phase starts at
contract award and continues thereafter. Although
overlapping in time with Implementation and Analysis, this
phase is different in nature. It includes the monitoring
process. The contractor's systems are periodically reviewed
24

and tested to ensure that they operate as intended and that
no changes in the systems or their use have occurred which
negate the original validation. The purpose here is to
ensure that the data base remains consistent. This assures
that both DOD and the contractor have a common zero point
from which to form their independent evaluations of progress
and cost to complete. The knowledge required here need not
be as in-depth as was necessary during implementation, for
rather than than having to start with nothing and
familiarize themselves with several sub-systems, those
charged with surveillance start with complete systems
descriptions
.
Ihe Analysis Phase starts as soon as contractor
systems start to produce reliable data. It is the process
of comparing actual to planned progress. During this period
SUPSHIP personnel must have knowledge of contractor systems
equal to that required during implementation. Both the
Joint Implementation Guide and the Joint Surveillance Guide
recommend that the same personnel be utilized to do both the
implementation and analysis [Ref. 1,10]
A sizeable part of the analysis task is mathmatical.
While the Air Force has progressed to the use of
computerized programs for analysing C/SCSC data, NAVSEA has
not reached that stage. Tne output of the contractor's
systems is data summarized at appropriate levels, in tne
form of variances between actual costs of work performed and
budgeted costs of work performed. There are no fixed rules
as to what variances are significant. Those charged with
analysis must look at each variance, determine if it is
significant, and then trace backwards through the systems to
analyse trends and locate trouble sources. C/SCSC guidance
refers to a Memorandum of Agreement between the Project
Office and the SUPSHIP, outlining the extent to which the
SUPSHIP will be responsible for this analysis phase of DODI
7000.2 [Ref. 1]. All three of the projects associated with
C/SCSC at the SUPSHIP indicated that they expected the
25

SUPSRIP to do all required analysis, as the office in the
best position to make meaningful judgements of progress.
Figure 2. shows an example of the complexity of
systems which go together to make up the Cost/Schedule
Control System of one major U.S. shipbuilder. To understand
thoroughly any such array of systems requires the talents of
several disciplines. Some would fall within the realm of
industrial engineering, others within accounting, logistics,
purchasing, contracts, etc. For any one discipline to do
justice to all systems would require either exceptionally
broad, talented people or a substantial period of
interdisciplinary training. As a minimum, a SUPSHIP
administering a major contract with C/SCSC as a requirement











EXAMPLE OF C^SCSC SUBSYSTEMS
COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
CONTRACT LABOR AND MATERIAL BUDGETING SYSTEM
OVERHEAD BUDGETING AND CONTROL SYSTEM
PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM
SHIPYARD DIRECT LABOR COST CONTROL SYSTEM
SHIPYARD DIRECT LABOR BUDGETING SYSTEM
MASTER PLANNING AND SCHEDULING SYSTEM
NEK CONSTRUCTION WORK AUTHORIZATION SYSTEM
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION CONTROL SYSTEM
MATERIAL CONTROL SYSTEM
INVENTORY CONTROL SYSTEM
PROCUREMENT COST/SCEDULE CONTROL SYSTEM
CONTRACT CHANGE CONTROL SYSTEM
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In the course of this investigation it became very
clear that the way business is conducted within the Navy is
not always based on any logical and rational decision
process, but sometimes is the resuit of an ingrained
parochialism and a reluctance to change. The following
guotes, purposely unattributed, were made by high level,
influencial persons during interviews conducted: "C/SCSC is
an industrial engineering function." "This is what
industrial engineers do best." "Any industrial engineer
worth his salt can handle this." A quick look into the
background cf these persons indicated that they had worked
extensively as industrial engineers, were industrial
engineers by education, or both. Another glance at the
skills reguired and Fig. 2. , which shows the systems one
might encounter, will show that C/SCSC is not totally an
industrial engineering function. An example would be the
Procurement System. Although the industrial engineer may in
the course of his education take courses in procurement
systems, more than likely his depth of knowledge in the area
is not significant. The multitude of requirements which are
government-specific, such as special clauses in Armed Forces
Procurement Begulations pertaining to the Small Eusiness
Administration etc. are not normally the bailiwick of the
engineer. An introductory knowledge or a cursory
familiarization with the subject is not sufficient if
government is truly to become involved or engaged with the
contractor. Further, if such engineers do exist with the
knowledge and experience to monitor, understand, and
evaluate the depicted control systems, they are not
available for hire at the GS 9-12 level. It is not intended
to down-play the industrial engineer for he is probably one
of the most important members of the implementation team.
He would be most knowledgeable in the systems for production
control, work authorizations and direct labor. On the other
hand, a materials specialist would be valuable for material
control, inventory control, and procurement systems, and the
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accountant valuable for cost accounting, overhead budgeting,
and direct labor, etc. The point being, that such systems
are not the exclusive domain of any single discipline, and
to summarily assign C/SCSC as a package to an industrial
engineering element may deprive the Supervisor and Project
Manager cf a substantial amount of relevant expertise and
advice.
2- Bole of the SUP SHIP in C/SCSC
During the era of firm-fixed-price contracting the
SUPSHIPS had no real incentive to closely monitor contractor
costs. Their efforts were, therefore, appropriately
directed to ensuring that the government received a quality
product at the appointed hour. Involvement with costs were
to the extent necessary to price out changes, make progress
payments, and to settle claims. The SUPSHIP organization
evolved to reflect this emphasis on performance and
schedule. The percentage of personnel involved directly
administration has been, and remains, small. For example,
while approximately 70>x> of acquisition dollars are expended
in subcontracts and overhead, less than 2% of field contract
administration personnel are involved in monitoring tnese
costs [Ref. 10].
It was not througn any shortcoming on the part of
the SUPSHIP that this situation developed, for the SUPSHIP's
mission did not include emphasis on the business aspects of
involvement. It was policy at the time that the internal
management control systems of a contractor were not the
proper concern of the Navy. It was policy to allow the
contractor to suffer tne penalties of inefficiencies in his
operations [Sef. 3]
The SUPSHIP organization responded to this
disengagenent policy and evolved naturally to emphasize
schedule and quality. Figure 3. shows the distribution of
personnel among the various departments at the three largest
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SUPSHIPS, Newport News, Pascagoula, and Groton. The size of
the Qu.ality Assurance (Q/A) department (performance
oriented) and the Planning department (also performance
oriented) are indicative of the extent to which this
emphasis has effected SUPSHiP manning. The personnel in Q/A
are generally v)/A specialists and shipwork inspectors. The
Planning department is more engineering oriented and
contains engineers and technicians in the various
engineering disciplines.
During the late sixties, the momentum of the
Engagement Concept constituted a change in mission for the
SUPSHIPS. Tne implications of this new mission have not yet
been fully realized, but it is clear that the SUPSKIPS have
not kept pace with the shift in emphasis (The distribution
of Fig. 3 represents SUPSHIP manning in 1975.) The
additional change away from the firm-fixed-price contract
and towards cost and incentive contracting has further
intensified the need for SUPSHIPS to become more cost
conscious, because under these type contracts the government
must now bear the major share of cost risk.
In 1970 NAVSEA, then NAVSHIPS, decided to alter the
standard organization by selective authorization of a
Business Review Staff (BRS) . In a Decision Paper entitled
"Business and Financial Management in SUPSHIPS," this staff
was authorized specifically to add emphasis and talent to
the SUPSHIPS in order to increase expertise and talent in
the cost vice technical area, and to develop a cost analysis
independent of DCAA. However, the BES was authorized in
only the three largest SUPSHIPS, Newport News, Pascagoula,
and Groton. As envisioned, the staff would consist of a
Supply Corp. Lieutenant Commander, postgraduate trained,' a
GS 13/14 Management Analyst, a GS 12/13 Financial Manager,
and a GS \2/\3 Industrial Engineer. A similar staff was
also to be formed in NAVSEA, consisting of three financial









































































Groton distribution does not include
thirty-five military personnel.
Newport News Command/Staff includes
Repai r personnel .
Where the Production Management Department
is not authorized, the majority of its




The emphasis of the BRS was clearly on the business and
financial aspects [Ref. 12 J. When Bath Iron Works was
awarded tne Patrol Frigate development contract, SUPSHIP
Bath joined the "big three" to make it the "big four" and
was authorized also to establisn a Business Review Staff.
This authorization was a NAVSEA initiative, not the result
of a SUPSHIP request, for no published criteria existed, in
the form of thresholds or otherwise, which would make a
SUPSHIP automatically eligible at some point for such an
augmentation.
Not until 1973 was any SUPSHIP organizational change
issued which specifically recognized and assigned the
responsibility for C/SCSC surveillance. A new Production
Management Department (code 600) was provided for, which,
with one exception, was only a realignment of existing
divisions (see Figure 4.) . The notable exception, was the
Production Engineering Division (PED) , tasked with C/SCSC
surveillance and analysis, and several other areas
including; safety, docking, facilities and industrial
engineering efficiency checks [Ref. 13 J. Those tasks ether
than C/SCSC were previously spread throughout the SUPSHIP
organization. (Appendix F fully describes the PED
functions.)
Unlike the BRS, the Production Management Department
is authorized at a SUPSHIP upon his attainment of a certain
threshold, $50 million or more in cost and incentive
contracts with a single contractor. This dollar level
ensures that any contract requiring C/SCSC also authorizes
the organizational change. To date, the same "big four"
have established or are in the process of establishing the
new department. Newport News has since requested and been
granted permission to disestablish the new PED because it
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3. Related Requirements Placed On The SUPSHIP
In' its effort to instill a business awareness in its
contract administration activities, and to further implement
the Engagement Concept, Headquarters, Naval Material Command
(NAVMAT) has recently issued a series of Navy Procurement
Directives (NPD) compelling a closer look at contractor
costs. These NPD's are not specifically aimed at C/SCSC,
but are so closely related, even overlapping, as to be
inseparable in practice.
NPD 20-70 2.5 requires each SUPSHIP to establish a
Cost Monitor, either an individual or an organizational
element, to monitor all contractor costs. Among the
functions of the monitor are, representation on
demonstration reviews and maintenance of surveillance in
connection with C/SCSC. The NPD specifically suggests tne
Business Review Staff, where authorized, tc perform these
functions [fief. 15 J.
NPD 23-108 requires the SUPSHIP to establish a
Subcontract Surveillance Program and to assign the
responsibility to an individual. To ensure that such a
program is properly drawn and carried out, NPD 23-101.1
directs the Contractor Procurement System Review (CPSR) team
to review not only the contractor, but also the SUPSHIP
surveillance program [fief. 16,17].
Lastly, a new NPD is in the process of being drafted
to require SUPSHIPS to have an individual assigned as an
Overhead Monitor. This program is the result of a Logistics
Management Institute study and SECDEF guidance already
distributed to SUPSHIPS for information [fief. 18,19].
Cost. monitoring, overhead monitoring, and
subcontract surveillance are all, to some extent, elements
of any C/SCSC program, and it seems unnecessary, even




As of this writing, SUPSHIPS Bath and Groton are the
only two who have made any significant progress in DODI
7000.2 implementation. Batn Iron Works, after nearly three
years of effort, has demonstrated completion of all
requirements of C/SCSC and will be the first shipbuilder to
have its system validated. With award to Lockheed of a
contract to nuild two submarine tenders (AS 39/40) , SUPSHIP
Thirteen has recently oecome the third to have to deal with
these problems, but has not yet decided just which approach
it will take. SUPSHIP Eleven, the catalyst for this study,
has since been relieved of the necessity of implementing
C/SCSC, as the Sea Control Ship goes unfunded. Newport News
and Pascagoula each have Production Management Departments
and Business Review Staffs, but no C/SCSC contract. All
SUPSHIPS are presently wrestling with the responsibilities
placed on them by the new NPD's.
During the Implementation phase with all of its
reviews, the proper skills are made available. Where the
SUPSHIP is deficient, NAVMAT and NAVSEA supplement the team.
During the later phases, such supplemental expertise will
not be available and the SUPSHIP will have to have the
needed skills within his own organization. Viewing C/SCSC
as a continuing ' process rather than a one-time
implementation, points then to a period of development and
transition for the SUPSHIPS, during which guidance and
standards are needed.
Although there has been a reluctance by shipbuilding
contractors to accept C/SCSC, this reluctance is breaking
down as more and more contractors are reporting successes as
a result of implementation. The trend now is toward wider
use of newly developed management systems on programs where
there is no formal requirement. Electric Boat would like to
try C/SCSC on a major repair or overhaul contract, and
Litton has requested that its systems at Pascagoula be
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validated even though no present contractual requirement
exists. This growing interest constitutes acknowledgement
by the shipbuilding industry that C/SCSC has become a fact
of life.
Those SUPSHIPS and contractors who have not had to face
up to C/SCSC are watching carefully the experiences of Bath





In the following discussion SUPSHIPS Bath and Groton
will be examined in light of current policy. The approach
taken by each will be described and compared to this policy
and to C/SCSC as it was intended. The personnel and skills
utilized in C/SCSC implementation will be measured against
the skills described as necessary by the Joint Logistic
Commanders. Variances from policy and guidance, previously
discussed, will be looked at in light of the situation and
problems encountered by the SUPSKIPS.
To the extent that NAVSEA guidance to the SUESHIPS
impinges upon their actions, tne role of NAVSEA will also be
examined
.
A. SUPS HIP BATH
1 • Organizat i en
SUPSHIP Bath has been administering since April 1972
the Patrol Jrigate contract with a C/SCSC requirement. The
Supervisor's organization manual assigns full responsibility
for C/SCSC to the Production Engineering Division; however,
the PED is not adequately manned to assume the task. The
PED was not authorized until September of 1973, months after
contract award, and was therefore not available to
participate in the C/SCSC reviews. The BRS was not
authorized until May 1974, and it likewise was not
available. Forced with the need to implement DODI 7000.2
upon contract award, the Supervisor was left with few
organizational alternatives to get the job done. He chose
an ad hoc "task group approach."
The Supervisor, himself, along with the PF Project
Officer (both military) , and other key personnel from his
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functional codes, made up this task group. Over time the
Supervisor gradually relinquished his part of the effort to
other team members. The resultant group, assembled to
implement C/SCSC, consisted of about five people, each with
C/SCSC as an additional duty.
As bits personnel were hired they were utilized
during the latter part of the implementation phase, but
primary responsioility remained with the task group.
Another reason why the BRS did not get assigned C/SCSC
responsibility was the fact that it has not yet stabilized.
The staff supervisor has been moved to the contracts
department and the supervisor billet remains vacant. The
Contracts Officer presently double-hats as the head cf the
staff. The Procurement Analyst position was filled but
subsequently vacated.
The FED like the BRS has not stabilized enough to
take on C/SCSC responsibility. The Supervisor still intends
to transfer this responsibility to the PED as soon as he
can. The intended organization of the Production Management
Department is as shown in Fig. 5. The PED will consist of
two industrial engineers and a clerk. It is intended that
these engineers will task other departments for assistance
in those areas where their expertise is inadequate. The
Supervisor intends to use the BRS as his personal staff to
which he can assign problems for staff study. Because the
BRS at Bath has not been, and is not, intended to be used
for C/SCSC, it will be only briefly described. Intended
were a Business and Industrial Specialist at GS 13, a
Procurement Analyst at GS 12, a Cost/ Price Analyst at GS 12







































































































In the PED, the Supervisor intends to have a GS 12
and a GS 9 industrial engineer. The GS 12 has not yet been
filled. Available to augment this division when necessary
will be the deputy department head (600b) , a GS 13
industrial engineer with some previous experience in C/SCSC
while at Groton. Actually the Deputy Department Head was
hired to head the PED, but in order to justify the GS 13
grade level, the deputy billet was established.
3. Training
The Supervisor at Bath, in order to bring his
people up to speed on C/SCSC did send three personnel to
AFIT, one to the recommended three-week course, and two to
the two-week surveillance course. Later he realized that
the personnel he had sent to school were, for other reasons,
not the ones he wanted on the i nplementation team. None of
the personnel who actually participated in the
implementation and validation effort had attended any school
on the subject. Bath personnel were therefore unable to
make judgements as to the value of available training.
** • Handling of Related Requirements
The NPD established requirements for cost and
overhead monitors and subcontract surveillance have all been
assigned to the BRS which presently consists of two people.
The Cost/Price Analyst handles the cost monitoring, and a
former DCAA auditor, now Staff Accountant, handles overhead.
The BRS is net presently manned to handle subcontracts and
procurement methods; therefore, subcontract surveillance in




5- Advantages and Disadvantages
There are advantages to the approach and philosophy
of SUP3HIF Bath. The task group or project approach to
C/SCSC implementation draws from existing resources, key
personnel and assigns them the responsibility. The process
is expedient. The time required for organizational set-up,
familiarization, hiring, and training is saved. The hiring
and training alone could conceivably take years. His use of
military personnel may have brought to the task group a
wider breadth of knowledge across the contract
administration spectrum, at the expense of detailed
functional expertise.
The disadvantages are more extensive. First, the
additional task may detract from previously assigned primary
duties, particularly in the case of the Supervisor and the
project officer. Utilizing key military people during
implementation may cause problems downstream during
surveillance and analysis due to a lack of continuity. The
knowledge of the contractor gained during validation may be
transferred with them. A major disadvantage seems to be the
possibility that the proper talent and expertise might not
be available within the SUPSHIP's organization to form such
a task group. Military officers, generally from the 1400
community, with years of excellent service in their field
but without a substantive business or financial background
might not be appropriate members of a group dedicated to the
understanding of a contractor's management ccntroi systems.
The lack of schooling may lead to spending unproductive time
and effort in a trial and error effort to learn. The lack
of a formal organizational element responsible for C/SCSC
may lead to insufficient attention to the task at hand by
task group members when other urgent matters loom. The
Supervisor's intention to ultimately shift all
responsibility to the Production Engineering Division will
alleviate the latter disadvantage, but the PED is not, after
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two years, manned, and when manned will be made up of only
industrial engineers. Thus, many of the disadvantages will
remain.
B. SUPSHIP GROTON
SUPSHIP Groton first became involved with C/SCSC with
award of the SSN 688 contract in November of 1973, and
subsequently with Trident design ana lead-ship contract.
The major difference between Groton and 3ath approaches is
that Groton had a 3RS already authorized and functioning
before award of contract. This fact made it easier for the
Supervisor to handle the new requirement largely with
existing assets.
1 • Organization
Groton, as stated earlier, has both a BRS and a PED.
Each is a manned and functioning element of the
organization. The BRS, or as it is locally known, the
Operations Support Group maintains overall responsibility
for implementation and analysis phases and provides the
overview and coordination where the program crosses
organizational boundaries. The comniand's view of the BRS is
that it should:
"provide the Supervisor with a nucleus of
expertise in business, financial, and operational
management concepts/procedures whicn can be utilized
to locus on problem aieas which are; (1) broader
than the scope of any one Department/S taf r , or (2)
of such depth as to require an effort qreater than
that wnich any one Department/Staff could support."
In actuality, this description of the BRS function is
exactly in line with the thinking ana intent of the NAVSEA
SUPSHIP Groton Organization Manual, SUPSHIP
Instruction 5<iS0. z, p. 3, 1 July 1974.
H2

personnel whc pioneered BRS authorization
. The scope of
C/SCSC is such that it meets these criteria for assignment
to the Groton Business Bevieu Staff. While the staff is
manned to do the necessary analysis, it is not capable of
performing all of the necessary surveillance. To accomplish
this, the staff maintains the total responsibility while
tasking the various functional departments to perform
surveillance of certain subsystems according to a
Surveillance Plan. The PED is one of the divisions tasked
by BRS to do surveillance, particularly in areas relaxed to
engineering and production.
2 • Personnel
The BRS at Groton is staffed by a LCDR (SC)
supervisor with a staff of seven men. Six of the seven
staff members are at the GS-13 level and one is a GS-11.
The expertise includes: a systems analyst, financial
analyst, procurement specialist, materials specialist, and
an auditor. Less emphasis was placed on the Civil Service
classifications of personnel hired than on the experience
and knowledge of how the shipbuilding industry operates. By
way of example, Groton indicated that if in search of a man
to serve on the staff to monitor contractor procurement
methods, the order of preference would be; first, someone who
was familiar with Electric Boat procedures; second, someone
who was familial with procurement procedures in the
shipbuilding industry in general; third, a Civil Service
designated Procurement Methods Analyst or Procurement
Analyst. Also
,






Only one member of the staff has attended the
recommended three-week. school,- out all members have
developed some knowledge of the Criteria via on-the-job
training. The one man who had attended school has become
one of C/SCSC's most avid salesmen. Unable to schedule
convenient school classes, the Supervisor has arranged to
bring C/SCSC instructors to Groton from Wright-Patterson
during September of this year where he expects to be able to
educate some twenty-five people at once. Air Force
Institute of Technology, School of Systems and Logistics at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base can provide this service,
although it is not their normal procedure and they do not
advertise the fact.
4. Handling of Related Requirements
The BBS is in the process of being reorganized to
brine together all of the recent requirements for monitors
into a centralized monitoring function. The BBS will have
the responsibility for the monitoring effort while each of
the departments is tasked with monitoring those contractor
systems wnich fall within their respective areas. For
example: Electric Boat's Direct Labor Cost Control System
falls in the area of production/industrial engineering and
therefore, may be assigned to the P£D. The BHS has the
expertise to plan, coordinate, and evaluate the PED effort.
The monitoring effort of these related requirements is done
in the same fashion as with C/SCSC, in tnat, the BUS has the
responsibility and does as much of the monitoring as is
practicable and tasks the departments with the remainder.
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5- Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantages of Groton's approach are significant.
First, it does bring to tne SUPSHIP- increased business and
financial expertise, enabling him to effectively monitor
costs. It integrates the C/SCSC monitoring effort with
other related monitoring requirements. It assigns
responsibility to one element, with the necessary skills at
hand, decreasing the chance that some part of the program
will be overlooked or "fall through the cracks." It has
long range stability as it aims more at knowing the
contractor rather than being aimed at a given contract. It
is a primary duty of an organizational element, thus
reducing the chance that it will be forsaken when crises
arise, as might be the case were it a secondary or
collateral duty.
The disadvantages are: First, It assigns to a
staff, responsibility over line elements. This point was
brought to tne author's attention by a member of the PED who
had been made accountable to the BES and was not happy about
it, pointing cut the fact that variations from perfect line/
staff relationships can have side effects. This approach
requires additional people and perhaps additional ceiling
points. Lastly, recognizing that these are essentially new
skill requirements for the SUP5HIPS, it is a time-consuming




C. THE NAVSEA ROLE
The SUPSHIPS are not centrally managed and
administered within NAVSEA. They receive direction and
resources from several NAVSEA offices. NaVSEA (07) is the
Field Activities Directorate and NAVSEA (074) is its SUPSHIP
Management Division, tasked with administering the
organization, manpower, and training needs of the SUPSHIPS,
Prior to a reorganization of NAYSEA, which brought the field
activities under one directorate, the SUPSHIP management
Division was under the Production Directorate as NAVSEA
(052) . Performance Measurement and C/SCSC responsibility
were assigned also under Production in (054) . With the
reorganization the SUPSHIPS and control of SUPSHIP resources
became (074), but C/SCSC remained under Production. The
situation now has (054) placing requirements on SUPSHIPS
while (074) controls the resources. For example; If a
SUPSHIP were to request from NAVSEA authority to establish
the Production Management Department t the request would go
to (074) . Not really familiar with the actual workings of
C/SCSC, (074) would send the request to (054) for comment..
The decision to allow the new department would actually be
made by (054) . Then (074) would make the decision on the
extent to which it could provide the resources. The result
is a situation of fragmented management of the SUPSHIPS. No
one office has both knowledge of the personnel and skill




1 - Organization Surges ted
"From the instructions, directives, and policy
guidance which have been promulgated throughout the DOD and
the Navy [Ref. 8,20], it seems clear that attention to the
business aspects of contract administration is what is
needed in the Navy if it is to comply with existing policy
directives. In its suggested organization NAVSEA assigns
C/SCSC responsibility to the Production Engineering Division
£Ref. 21]. NAVSEA's primary concern is that the job get
done, the organization used to accomplish this end being
only of subordinate interest. Since only four SUPSHIPS have
a BRS, it was net possible for NAVSEA to suggest assignment
of C/SCSC to such a staff unless NAVSEA was willing to
authorize a ERS at all SUPSHIPS administering a major
contract. Additionally, it is felt that assignment of such
responsibilities to a staff would cause it to cease being a
staff function, the thought being, that continuing efforts
belong in the functional organization and not to a staff.
One other aspect was clear; that C/SCSC belonged more to the
realm of industrial engineering than to any other discipline
and ; therefore, should be assigned to an industrial
engineering element. In summary: it could not go to a
staff; it had to go to a line element; it should be an
industrial engineering element. So goes the reasoning
behind the PED. In light of the previously discussed
reguireraents for C/SCSC analysis alone, the PED is assigned
a formidable responsibility.
The fact that NAVSEA through its organization
manuals has pretty much dictated the approved organization
of its field activities, has been the subject of some
discontent on the part of the SUPSHIPS. They have expressed
a desire to organize as they see necessary to best perform
their functions. A study of the matter by Logistics
Management Institute concurred [Ref. 22]. In response to
this desire for increased flexibility, NAVSEA is in the
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process of issuing a new instruction promulgating an
organization manual for the SUPSHIPS which will delete the
organizational sections of the Ship Acguisition Contract
Administration Manual (SACAM) and the Ship Repair
Contracting Manual {Repair Manual.) The impact of this
instruction may well be to give the Supervisors the
authority and flexibility to organize to accomplish the
tasks as they see them, keeping NAVSEA informed [fief. 23],
To date NAVSEA's guidance to the SUPSHIPS has been
in the form cf authorizations for organizational change. No
guidance has been promulgated which addresses how the
SUPSHIP is to go about accomplishing the new requirements in
terms of skills required to effectively manage multi-million
dollar programs.
2- Personnel Policies
The SUPSHIP Management Division of NAVSEA (code 074)
administers personnel lesources at the SUPSHIP. Within its
allotted ceiling points, increases in manning levels aie
authorized on a case basis to field activities. As is the
case throughout the EOD there are pressures to keep manning
levels lew and further, to keep grade levels as low as
possible consistent with the needs of the Department [Ref.
24]. "Grade creep," as it is known, is an area of major
concern in government. In this environment NAVSEA must be
judicious in the assignment of increased ceiling points, and
stand ready to justify its actions.
Aside from the management problems inherent in the
NAVSEA organization, a part of the problem is SUPSHIP
generated. A review of correspondence between the SUPSHIPS
and NAVSEA concerning requests for additional ceiling points
associated with receipt of a C/SCSC contract clearly
indicated either lack of knowledge or lack of interest on
the part of SUPSHIPS. Thoughtful justification for new
personnel is not conveyed. Ceiling points authorized vary
considerably from those requested. As an example, one
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SUPSHIP, upon receiving a major contract to administer,
requested an additional sixty ceiling points specifying only
that the breakdown would be a certain number to each of his
departments. No indication of the types of skill shortages
or estimated utilization of these sixty persons accompanied
the request. NAVSEA's reply was authorization of twenty
ceiling points. Without doing any sort of mathmatical
analysis, it did appear that those who justified their
requests faired better in their quest for scarce resources.
NAVSEA did indicate that it would consider
authorization of ceiling points in advance of contract
award, if requested, in order to aid the SUPSHIPS in
shortening the administrative lead-time required to get
organized, but this indication is nowhere documented.
3- I^aininq Plans
Recognizing the inadequacy of manpower resources and
the increasing complexity of field contract administration
NAVSEA has undertaken a major attempt at a training plan for
SUPSHIP use. The plan, called Skill/Knowledge Improvement
Program (SKIP), attempts to display in a matrix format all
the functions a SUPSHIP must perform and ail the skills and
knouledge necessary to perform those functions. It goes
further in specifying the depth or degree of skill reguired
for any given function, and lists those courses and schools,
etc. through which such a skill might be developed. The
S/KIP written by NAVSEA covers only one organizational
element of the SUPSHIP. Subsequent portions of the program
are to be written by the SUPSHIPS for their own use.
The first part of the SUPSHIP organization addressed
is the Production Engineering Division, an element clearly
in need of help if it is to perform its intended function.
The entire SKIP is based on the assumption that the SUPSHIPS
are organized and have responsibilities assigned in
accordance with NAVSEA's approved organizaticn outlined in
SACAM. because the Production Engineering Division is
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supposed to have the responsibility for C/SCSC surveillance
and analysis, the SKIP for the Production Engineering
Division addresses C/SCSC skills. A problem here is the
fact that nc two SUPSHIPS are organized in the same fashion
despite the promulgated standard.
To illustrate, Appendix C, extracted from the SKIP,
is a list of those skills where an in-depth knowledge is
required for effective accomplishment of the Production
Engineering Division's C/SCSC responsibility. The list does
not include those skills where only a cursory knowledge is
required, nor does it include skills required for Production
Engineering Division functions other than C/SCSC.
Response by the SUPSHIPS to an advanced copy
distributed for review and comment, was mixed. Most of the
affirmative comments indicated approval of the method
outlined of determining skill requirements, ratner than the
practicality of actually implementing the program in
acquiring needed skills. Some even went to the extent of
saying words to the effect, "The format is good, but please
don't make compliance a requirement.' 1 An interesting
insight into NAVSEA's view of the PED is the fact that the
SKIP instruction refers to PED members as engineers, not as
business or financial people [Ref. 25].
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IV. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS
A. DISPARITIES BETWEEN SUPSHIP AND NAVSEA APPROACHES
Of the two SUPSHIPS, Bath and Groton, who have
undertaken C/SCSC implementation, neither has utilized the
NAVSEA suggested approach. In neither has the PED been
given the responsibility intended when it was established.
Bath intends to work into the suggested organization, but
due to difficulties in finding qualified applicants (Bath
being situated in a relatively remote, non-industrial corner
of the country)
, ana to the time which will be required to
transfer the necessary knowledge from the task group to the
Production Engineering Division, tne process is likely no
take years to complete. Groton has no intention of giving
to the PED the C/SCSC responsioility intended by NAVSEA, but
rather is concentrating its efforts in building up the
Business Review Staff. Neitner Bath nor Groton is using
primarily industrial engineers during implementation,
although Bath does intend to use them when the Production
Engineering Division is fully manned. Groton is taking a
multi-disciplinary approach utilizing primarily business and
financial people, but including an industrial engineer.
SUPSHIP personnel are not sufficiently trained in
C/SCSC and its implementation, and must rely on NAVSEA and
NAVMAT personnel during early contractor reviews. This
reliance decreases with subsequent reviews leading to final
demonstration review. The point being, that training,
fcrmal or on-the-job, has not been sufficiently timely.
Although both Bath and Groton utilized military
personnel tc supervise the implementation effort, only
Groton will maintain this posture. Bath's intended use of




B. REASONS FOR DISPARITIES
The reasons for the disparities are in some cases
obvious, but in others they are somewhat subtle. Bath's
failure to use the NAVSEA pro-posed organization to implement
C/SCSC is easy to see. Practically speaking, there just
wasn't time to establish the PED, hire the necessary talent,
and conduct training. In the view of SUPSHIP personnel,
this process requires a minimum of one year lead-time before
the organization is really ready to function. Assuming that
the people you need are available somewhere, the process of
writing position descriptions, publishing the opening
through the Civil Service Commission, waiting for
applicants, interviewing, making a choice, and lastly,
waiting for the newly hired applicant to arrive takes from
two to ten months. Once people arrive there is usually some
administrative time required for familiarization with the
organization and the job to be assumed.
C/SCSC schooling is next, but the needed coui5«
convenes onl^ quarterly and quotas have to be arranged. The
C/SCSC Implementation course itself is three weeks in
duration. All of this process is time-consuming, and if not
started until after the contract is awarded, guarantees that
the SUPSHIP will not be ready to participate in the early
reviews.
Authorization for a PED after award of a C/SCSC contract
forced the Supervisor to form his team by an alternative
method. So, although the Supervisor agreed with the NAVSEA
approach, he could not implement it. Bath's use of military
personnel was forced upon him due to the constraints of
time.
At Groton, the reason was one of philosophy. Groton
disagrees with the establishment of a production/industrial
engineering organization to handle C/SCSC, and is organizing
along the ERS approach. C/SCSC is seen as a task which
crosses functional lines and is larger than could properly
52

be handled by one department. Although hiring ana training
lead-time were still a problem, the impact was less severe
than at Bath because the BRS is authorized independent of
contract award and can be organized in advance to be ready




As a result of the study conducted, the conclusions
fall into four general areas as follows:
1. JUNCTIONAL SKILLS REQUIRED FOR C/SCSC: SUPSHIP
Groton has in his organization an element dedicated to the
business management of major acquisitions. This element
does have the skills outlined in the standard. While
SUPSHIP Bath has no such element, it did adequately meet the
requirements of implementation, in large part due to the
expertise vested in military members of the C/SCSC task
group. Snould these military members be transferred,
SUPSHIP Bath will not nave the proper skills for
surveillance and analysis. The combination of military
members and ad hoc approach is not conducive to long range
surveillance and analysis,
2. TRAINING SKILLS REQUIRED FOR C/SCSC: Neither
SUPSHIP had significant training in C/SCSC, and neither yet
meets the standard. None of Bath's, and only one of
Groton* s personnel have attended the required course.
SUPSHIP Groton is taking steps to acquire the required
training by arranging for the AFIT course to be conducted on
site.
3. ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES: The Production
Engineering Division is not at a level within the SUPSHIP
organization that will allow it to be staffed with
sufficiently talented and experienced personnel to
accommodate C/SCSC and other related requirements.
Additionally, the PED is too low in the organization to
allow it to task other departments where C/SCSC crosses
functional lines. The Business Review staff appears to be a
more balanced approach. It draws from several disciplines
and provides an organizational element dedicated to the
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business and financial aspects of contract administration.
Furthermore, it is at a level which does allow for the
accumulation of the proper expertise and for the crossing of
departmental lines. The task group approach serves only
expedience and is not appropriate for a continuing function.
4. THE NAVSEA SOLE: A communication gap exists between
NAV21AT and NAVSEA in the guidance to SUPSHIPS. NAVMAT has
outlined skills and training required to implement C/SCSC,
but NAVSEA seems caught up in a concern for proper
organization rather than concerning itself with the skills
and expertise required to properly do C/SCSC as does the
NAVMAT guidance. The suggested PED indicates a concern for
C/SCSC but does not address the larger problem of business
management of major acquisitions, in that it does not
provide for the handling of related requirements. These new
requirements continue to assign new business responsibility
to the SUPSHIP without also providing proper resources and
guidance. Lastly, the policy of establishing a PED or bRS
after contract award comes too late to be of real value to
the SUPSHIP.
As stated earlier, C/SCSC is but one tool, but it
appears to be one with a good degree of permanence. Other
instructions and policy guidance emanating from the various
echelons of command either supplement, augment, or exist
alongside C/SCSC. For this reason, planning for C/SCSC in
the years ahead seems both necessary and desireable. C/SCSC
implementation within the Navy and specifically within
shipbuilding is most noteworthy in that it lags behind
airplanes, missiles, tanks, and satellites (see Appendices
D. and E.). Perhaps a broader, more innovative attitude
would help in achieving the common purpose of ail field
contract administration activities, which is to properly




VI. RECOrtrtEN DAT IONS
At this point the last of the objectives of this study
will be addressed in a proposed approach which incorporates
lessons learned from those who have been down this road
before. It is hoped that this proposal will be considered
on its merits by NAVSEA and the SUPSHIPS.
A. 0RGAHIZA1I0N
The SUPSHIP standard organization is as it is f6r a
multitude of reasons. Only the assignment of C/SCSC
responsibility within that organization is at issue here.
It is proposed that NAVSEA authorize a Business Review Staff
at any SUPSHIP where there is a good probability of a major
contract award. This would not include those SUPSHIPS whose
business is primarily the administration of repair
contracts. It would include those who are involved with
contractors who are actively bidding or negotiating for
major contracts. Of top priority would be those SUPSHIPS
who are in a position of possible contract administration
with a large contractor, such as Boeing, with its
involvement in the PHIi program, or with several fairly large
contractors, such as the combination of Todd, LocKheed, and
Boeing, or the combination of Todd, Rohr, and NASSCO. Those
SUPSHIPS who have to deal with a very large contractor or
several major contractors are in a situation where a
centralized monitoring element is needed for C/SCSC and
other reguirements related to the involvement concept. The
staff should be authorized and ceiling points allotted as
was originally intended and previously described (see page
30) . This BBS should be given full responsibility for DODI
7000.2 and the cost and overhead monitoring reguirements of
the NPD's.

The Production Management Department and its Production
Engineering Division may be established, if desired, tc meet
other requirements, but should not be tasked with primary
C/SCSC responsibility nor established for that purpose. The
PED need not be established at all, as is the case at
Newport News. Use of such a centralized staff serves to
ensure that the business aspects of contract administration
are addressed and have a recognized place in the SUPSHIP
organization.
B. PERSONNEL
The ERS should initially include a Lieutenant
Commander (postgraduate trained in Acquisition Management)
,
a GS 14/13 Management analyst, a GS 13/12 Procurement
Methods Analyst, and a GS 13/12 Industrial Engineer, each to
handle contractor systems related to his discipline. When
the SUPSHIP has a major contract to administer and the
implementation phase is in full swing, additional staff
members recommended would be a Cost/Price Analyst with
auditing background to serve as overhead monitor and DCAA
liaison, and a Materials Specialist knowledgeable in the
materials aspects of the shipbuilding industry. Both should
be at the GS 13/12 level. Such staffing will allow the
SUPSHIP to meet the skill standard previously outlined, and
to combine C/SCSC with other monitoring functions with a
minimum of duplicative effort.
The Civil Service job classifications are less
important than the actual experience desired. For this
reason Position Descriptions are critical. The concept of
C/SCSC is not difficult and can be acquired by careful
reading of the instructions and published guides [Refs.
1,10,20] or through short schools; therefore, emphasis in
hiring should not be on previous C/SC5C experience, but
rather on past experience in a functional area particularly
as it relates to shipbuilding. Position Descriptions should
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be directed at a search for knowledge in areas such as
materials, budgets, and work breakdowns which cannot be
taught in a short period of time.
The staff should be civilian except for its supervisor
who should be military in order to have in that position
someone who has a broader perspective of the acquisition
process and is not likely to suffer from functional
loyalties.
C. TRAINING
The Lieutenant Commander, or senior member of the BRS,
should attend the five day C/SC5C Course for Functional
Managers at the Defense Systems Management School at Fort
Belvoir. At least two of the other three initial members
should have previous experience with C/3CSC or should attend
the three-week "Evaluation of Performance Measurement
Systems" course at the Air Force Institute of Technology, at
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and attendance by all
members is highly desireable.
D. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF RECOMMENDED APPROACH
By authorizing the BRS at certain SUPSKIPS before
actual award of any C/SCSC contract, there exists the
possibility that some SUPSHIP may have a staff of four
persons and no contract. This would certainly constitute
overkill and a disadvantage. Also the suggested G5 14/13/12
talent is expensive and does contribute to an already
top-heavy Civil Service profile.
The advantages outweign the disadvantages. Early
establishment of a Business Review Staff, independent of
contract award, gives the SUPSHIP time to respond and be
ready to perform his mission upon execution of a contract.
It constitutes a planned approach to an imminent problem
rather than a reaction to an existing problem. Lead-time
allows for a more thorough hiring process giving the SUPSHIP
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the ability to find and hire tne man who fits rather than
hiring a man and making him fit. Where training is still
reguired after selective hiring, there is time. Time to
train personnel may allow hieing at the GS 12 level rather
than buying knowledge at the GS 13 level. Probably the
largest advantage is that it brings together a broad range
of expertise which can provide the Supervisor with
evaluative material and recommendations relative to the
business/management practices of the shipbuilder, in
compliance with the concept of "Engagement," and with DODI
5000. 1.
This approach is based on a need for business and
management acumen within the SUPSHIPS. It does not see the
problem as a need for industrial engineering expertise
beyond that which has been discussed. This may be an
advantage or a disadvantage depending on the reader's
background.
Lastly, some compendium of approaches taken, lessons
learned, triumphs and failures should be made available to
the Supervisors of Shipbuilding to aid them in achieving
their mission objectives with a minimum of costly trials and
errors. This study might serve as a start on such a
compendium. Regardless of the approach taken by those who
in the future must make this decision, the more exhaustive
the alternatives considered, the more likely is the decision




















Patrol frigate Ship Acquisition Project
Trident Submarine Ship Acquisition Project




C/SCSC TRAINING COURSES AVAILABLE
C/SCSC Course for Program Managers -2 1/2 days, Defense
Systems Management School (DSMS) , Fort Beivoir, Virginia
(autovon354-5220)
C/SCSC Course for Functional Managers «-5 days, (DSMS)
Evaluation cf Performance Measurement Systems -3 weeks, Air
Force Institute of Technology, School of Logistics (AFITSL)
,
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (autovon
737-2228/4802)
Surveillance of Performance Measurement Systems -2 weeks
(AFITSL)
Managing with Contractor Performance Data -2 weeks, Array





PED SKILLS REQUIRED FOR C/SCSC
ABSTRACTED FROM S/KIP
A. BUSINESS -Skill, knowledge, and capability of
determining, evaluating, and understanding the general daily
business operations of a contractor.
A-1. Organization: Skill in determining adequacy of
contractor organizations. Capability of analyzing
organizational charters and their functions in relation to
satisfactory accomplishment of the job. Skill in
determining how the contractor fits into his corporate
structure. In-depth understanding of complicated
organizational charts.
A-2. Planning: Skill in determining adequacy of the
contractor's planning system. Knowledge of the planning
cycle from pre-award of contract to product delivery.
Knowledge of how various organizational elements interface
for overall planning purposes. Capability of planning a job
by incorporating the resources required for total planning.
A-3. Scheduling: Knowledge of the contractor's scheduling
system. Skill in determining the adequacy of contractor's
schedules. Skill in understanding various types of
scheduling techniques and their adequacy for the purpose
applied. Capability of determining adequacy of a particular
schedule.
A-4. Budgeting: Knowledge of the development of a
contractor's budgeting system. Capability to recognize
whether budgets are too high or too low for the specific
job. Capability to recognize the management reserve budget.
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A-5. Industrial Accounting: Knowledge of accounting
terms,e.g., overhead direct cost, indirect cost, management
reserve, etc. Capability to perform reconcilliations of
complicated reports. Knowledge of how overhead rates are
derived.
A-6. Management: The understanding of contractor
management technigues and how they are applied. The
understanding of contractor management procedures and the
analysis of their effectiveness. Understanding of the needs
of contractor management in order to effectively manage a
program.
A-7 Contracts: Knowledge of the various types of contracts
and their use. Knowledge of the content of the general
provisions of a contract and the reason for special contract
provisions. Knowledge of who within NAVSEA writes the
contract and how input can oe provided.
A-8. Work Breakdown Structure (WuS) : Skill in ascertaining
if the WBS is complete and personnel are assigned work
responsibilities. Capability of tracing elements of work
from the lower levels of the WBS up to livel 1. Skill in
developing the Government's WBS for the contract.
A-10. DOBI 7000.2: Knowledge of DODI 7000.2 and NAVAT
P2540 and their application and use in a contract.
Capability of determining if a contractor's cost schedule
system meets the intent of DODI 7000.2. Skill in
ascertaining changes to a contractor's system in relation to
meeting the intent of the validated system.
B. ANALYSIS - Skill, knowledge and capability of performing
a variety of analytic technigues to correctly evaluate
contractor provided information.
B-1. Analytic: Skill in reviewing the various elements of
the contractor's position in proper perspective. Capability
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of bumping the contractor's position against a
pre-determined workable concept. Skill in applying
mathematics to formulate a Navy position.
B-2. Reconcilliations: Capability of sorting through
various reports to verify contractor statements. Knowledge
of which reports or computer runs will provide the data
required and if such data is valid. Knowledge in the use of
desk calculators and advanced mathraatics.
B-3. Cost Analysis: Capability of determining the validity
of contractor's price proposals. Capability of determining
the validity of the standards used for determining price.
Capability of developing escalation factors and applying
them to the contractor's price to determine its validity.
C. PRODUCTION - Skill, knowledge and understanding of
hardware, software, personnel, and techniques used in
shipyard production.
C—1. Estimating: Skill in identifying adequacy of
contractor's budgeting of work, e.g., are work packages
budgeted too high or too low. Knowledge of the contractor's
estimating system. Skill in determining tne adequacy of the
contractor's estimating standards and if derived in a
logical manner.
C-2. Shipyard Skills and Trades: Understanding of skill
requirements for various shipyard trades. Capability of
distinguishicg the difference between good and poor
workmanship. Knowledge of trades required during various
construction schedule time frames.
C-7. Industrial Engineering: Understanding of plant
layout. Capability of developing facility analysis and
ascertaining skill requirement analysis. Skill in
determining adequacy of production menthods. Knowledge of
industrial engineering in the shipbuilding industry.
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C-8. Plan Understanding: Skill in understanding the most
difficult engineering drawings and in visualizing potential
drawing changes.
D. SU5HIP INTERFACES - Knowledge and understanding of
relationships and interfaces between and amcng government
and non-governmental organizations interfacing with the
SUPSHIPS.
D-1. Navy/Ccntractor Relationship: Knowledge of Navy
policy governing communications with contractors. Knowledge
of proper methods and channels for discussions with
contractor, documentation of discussions/meetings with
contractor, formal written communications with contractor.
Skill in properly challenging contractor statements or
letters with facts formulated from in-depth Navy reviews.
D-2. SACAM: Knowledge of the Ship Acquisition Contract
Administraricn Manual and its effects on a SUPSHIP office.
D-5. SUPSLIP/NAVSEA Relationship: Knowledge of who the
cognizant SHAPW for a particular contract is, who to call in
NAVSEA for assistance with particular problems. Skill in
identifying problems requiring solutions at SUPSHIP or
NAVSEA level.. Understanding of NAVSEA and its various field
activities and their places in the program cycle.
D-6. Change Order Cycle: Knowledge of the change order
cycle in a particular contract and MIL-STD-480. Knowledge
of who initiates change orders. Understanding of
engineering change proposals initiation and process of
becoming formal changes. Knowledge of negotiations of the
change up to adjudication.
G. GENERAL - Skill, knowledge, and capability of various
procedures and techniques that assist SUPSHIP personnel in
daily operations.
G-1. Technical Writing: Capability of writing technical
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reports cr letters in a clear, concise, comprehensive
manner.
G-2. Verbal Communications: Capability of stating what has
to be said in a clear manner that is understood by all
people. Capability of chairing meetings and leading
discussions that produce constructive results.
G-3. Math and Statistics: Capability of using mathematical
principles in computations needed in other skill/knowledge
reguirements. Knowledge of basic statistical terminology.
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NAVSEA PROJECTS CURRENTLY INVALIDATED
1. TRIDENT INTEGRATED RADIO ROOM —ITT
2. TRIDENT DESIGN — GENERAL DYNAMICS, ELECTRIC BOAT DIV,
3. SSN 688 —GENERAL DYNAMICS, ELECTRIC BOAT DIV.
U. TRIDENT SONAR — IBM
5. SEA CONTROL SHIP -NASSCO





PRODUCTION ENGINEERING DIVISION FUNCTIONS
The Production Engineering Division shall:
(a) Maintain surveillance, and evaluate changes to
contractor's cost and schedule control system to ensure
compliance with contractual requirements. Identify
policies, practices or procedures that are not effective;
not in accordance with contractual requirements; or not in
compliance with the procedures demonstrated in DODI 7000.2
validation.
(b) Document the Performance Measurement Baseline
budget for each contract, track and report performance
trends in terms of Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled, Budgeted
Cost of Work Performed, and Actual Cost of Work Performed.
Conduct variance analyses to identify potential
cost/schedule prcolems, their causes, and proposed
corrective action. Reconcile external Cost Performance
Reports with contractor's internal data.
(c) Develop and maintain sufficient familiarity with
the contractor's cost estimating system and cost experience
to participate effectively in evaluation of contractor's
cost proposals and budgets.
(d) Investigate, evaluate, and report on contractor's
production processes and productivity. Identify corrective
actions that could be taken to correct areas of inefficient
work methods, equipment, facilities, low productivity, or,
adverse performance trends.
(e) Investigate, evaluate and report on contractor's
production facility matters as they relate to ship contract
work; including the allocation of facilities to contracts,
maintenance actions, improvement plans, and plant equipment
procurement programs. Identify Government actions required
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to support or modify these activities to ensure cost
effective performance on Government contracts.
(x) Develop, implement and carry out a continuing
program to compare the costs of work, items, functional work
areas, and/or contracts with similar work performed by otner
contractors.
(g) Develop SUPSHIP's position relative to the
contractor's capability to produce under a new contract, as
a part of a Pre-Award Survey effort.
(h) Monitor the contractor's docking program for Navy
ships. This includes surveillance of eacn docking
operation, training of SUPSHIP personnel, reviewing written
procedures of both SUPSHIP and contractor, auditing the
maintenance condition of the contractor's docks, etc.
(i) The development and promulgation cf procedures for











COST/SCHEDULE CONTROL SYSTEMS CRITERIA
CHECKLIST ITEMS
I. ORGANIZATION
1. DEFINE ALL THE AUTHORIZED WORK AND
RELATED RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF THE CONTRACT, USING THE FRAME-
WORK OF THE CWBS.
a. Is only one CWBS used for the contract (attach
copy of CWBS) ?
YES
b. Is the contract work statement relatable to elements
of the CWBS and the project summary WBS?
c. Are the following items included in the CWBS
(annotate copy of WBS to show elements below) ?
NO REMARKS
TT f rrn i n i i im i i
I
CRITERIA!;:
(1) Applicable project summary WBS elements.
(2) Contract line items and end items.
(3) All WBS elements specified for reporting.
(4) CWBS elements to be subcontracted, with iden-
tification of subcontractors.
(5) Cost accounts.
2. IDENTIFY THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL
ELEMENTS AND THE MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS
RESPONSIBLE FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE AUTHOR-
IZED WORK.
a. Are all authorized tasks assigned to identified or-
ganizational elements? (This must occur at the cost account
level as a minimum. Prepare exhibit showing relationships.)
b. Is subcontracted work defined and identified to the
appropriate subcontractor within the proper WBS element?
(Provide representative example.)
3. PROVIDE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE CON-
TRACTOR'S PLANNING, SCHEDULING. BUDGETING,
WORK AUTHORIZATION. AND COST ACCUMULA-
TION SYSTEMS WITH EACH OTHER, THE CWBS AND






a. Are the subsystems listed above integrated with each
other, the CWBS and the organizational structure at the
following levels : (Use matrix to illustrate the relationships.)
(1) Total contract?
(2) Cost account?
4. IDENTIFY THE MANAGERIAL POSITIONS RE-




a. Are the individuals responsible for the planning and
control of indirect costs (overhead) clearly identified?
5. PROVIDE FOR INTEGRATION OF THE CWBS
WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S FUNCTIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN A MANNER THAT PER-
MITS COST AND SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE MEAS-
UREMENT FOR CWBS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ELE-
MENTS. (Reference format 1.)
i
CRITERIA
a. Is each cost account assigned to a single organiza-
tional element directly responsible for the work and identi-
fiable to a single element of the CWBS?
b. Are the following elements for measuring perform-
ance available at the levels selected for control and analysis
:
(1) Budgeted cost for work scheduled?
(2) Budgeted cost for work performed?
(3) Applied (actual) costs of work performed?
II. PLANNING AND BUDGETING
1. SCHEDULE THE AUTHORIZED WORK IN A
MANNER WHICH DESCRIBES THE SEQUENCE OF
WORK AND IDENTIFIES THE SIGNIFICANT TASK
INTER-DEPENDENCIES REQUIRED TO MEET THE
DEVELOPMENT. PRODUCTION, AND DELIVERD RE-
QUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT.
a. Does the scheduling system contain: (Prerar*
hibit showing traceability from contract task lev.: to work
package schedules.)




(2) Intermediate schedules as required which pro-
vide a logical sequence from the master schedule to the cost
account level?
(3) Detailed schedules which support cost account
and work package start and completion dates/events?
b. Do key milestones identify significant constraints
and interfaces?
c. Does the scheduling system provide for the identifi-
cation of work progress against technical and other mile-
stones, and also provide for forecasts of completion dates
of scheduled work?
d. Are work packages formally scheduled in terms of
physical accomplishment and reflected by calendar dates?
2. IDENTIFY PHYSICAL PRODUCTS, MILESTONES,
TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE GOALS, OR OTHER
INDICATORS THAT WILL BE USED TO MEASURE
OUTPUT.
IjiilSSffiMJA
a. Are meaningful indicators identified for use in
measuring the status of cost and schedule performance?
(Provide representative samples.)
b. Does the contractor's system identify work accom-
plishment against the schedule. plan? (Provide representa-
tive examples) .
c. Are current work performance indicators and goals
relatable to original goals as modified by contractual
changes and reprogramming actions? (Provide exhibit
showing incorporation of changes to original indicators and
goals.)
3. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A TIME-PHASED
BUDGET BASELINE AT THE COST ACCOUNT LEVEL
AGAINST WHICH CONTRACT PERFORMANCE CAN
BE MEASURED. INITIAL BUDGETS ESTABLISHED
FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL BE BASED ON THE NEGO-
TIATED TARGET COST. ANY OTHER AMOUNT USED
FOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT PURPOSES
MUST BE FORMALLY RECOGNIZED BY BOTH THE
CONTRACTOR AND THE GOVERNMENT. (Reference
formats 2 and 8.)
( R.J 1 1 ::l\
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a. Are budgets assigned to cost accounts (and budget
planning packages as appropriate) maintained as the per-
formance measurement baseline? (Explain baseline main-
tenance procedures.)
b. Is the entire contract planned to the cost account
level of detail to the extent practicable? In the event that
future contract effort cannot be defined in sufficient detail
to allow the establishment of cost accounts; are the budgets
assigned to WBS elements at the lowest level of planning
detail used for baseline maintenance?
c. Does the contractor require sufficient detail planning
of cost accounts to constrain the application of budget ini-
tially allocated for future effort to current effort? (Explain
procedure.)
d. Are cost accounts opened and closed based on the
start and completion of work contained therein?
4. ESTABLISH BUDGETS FOR ALL AUTHORIZED
WORK WITH SEPARATE IDENTIFICATION OF COST
ELEMENTS (LABOR, MATERIAL, ETC.).
IJjjCRITERIA
a. Does the budgeting system contain: (Prepare
sample exhibit.)
(1) The total budget for the contract (including
estimates for authorized but unpriced work) ?
(2) Budgets assigned to major functional organiza-
tions? (See checklist item II, 9a.)
i —
(3) Budgets assigned to cost accounts and/or plan-
ning packages?
b. Are the budgets assigned to cost accounts planned
and identified in terms of the following cost elements?
(Provide exhibit.)
(1) Direct labor dollars.
(2) Material and/or subcontract dollars.
(3) Other direct dollars.
c. Arc budgets or values assigned to work packages in
terms of dollars, hours, or other measurable units?
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d. Does the work authorization system contain: (Pre-
pare sample exhibit.)
•
(1) Authorization to proceed with all authorized
work?
(2) Appropriate work authorization documents
which subdivide the contractual effort and responsibilities
within functional organizations.
(3) Authorizations for work within cost accounts
with identification of the responsible organization?
5. TO THE EXTENT THE AUTHORIZED WORK CAN
BE IDENTIFIED IN DISCRETE, SHORT-SPAN WORK
PACKAGES, ESTABLISH BUDGETS FOR THIS WORK
IN TERMS OF DOLLARS, HOURS, OR OTHER MEAS-
URABLE UNITS. WHERE THE ENTIRE COST AC-
COUNT CANNOT BE SUBDIVIDED INTO DETAILED
WORK PACKAGES. IDENTIFY THE FAR TERM EF-
SSkCRITERIA
FORT IN LARGER PLANNING PACKAGES FOR BUD-
GET AND SCHEDULING PURPOSES. (Reference for-
mats 6, 6a, and 6b.)
a. Do work packages reflect the actual way in which
the work will be done and are they meaningful product or
management orientated subdivisions of a higher level ele-
ment of work?
4
b. Are detailed work packages planned as far in ad-
vance as practicable? (Provide representative sample.)
i c. Is work progressively subdivided into detailed work
packages as requirements are defined?
•
'
d. Is future work which cannot be planned in detail
subdivided to the extent practicable for budgeting and
scheduling purposes. (Provide sample.)
e. Are work packages reasonably short in time dura-
tion to minimize the inprocess effort?
f. Do work packages consist of discrete tasks which
are adequately described? (Provide representative sample.)




6. PROVIDE THAT THE SUM OF ALL WORK PACK-
AGE BUDGETS PLUS PLANNING PACKAGES WITHIN
A COST ACCOUNT EQUALS THE COST ACCOUNT
BUDGET. (Reference format 2.)
ICRITERIA
a. Does the sum of all work package budgets plus plan-
ning packages within selected cost accounts equal the bud-
gets assigned to those cost accounts?
7. IDENTIFY RELATIONSHIPS OF BUDGETS OR
STANDARDS IN UNDERLYING WORK AUTHORIZA-
TION SYSTEMS TO BUDGETS FOR WORK PACKAGES.
IiCRITERIA
a. For the production effort where engineered stand-
ards or other internal work measurement systems are used,
is there a formal relationship between these values and work
package budgets? (Provide samples showing relationships.)
8. IDENTIFY AND CONTROL LEVEL OF EFFORT
ACTIVITY BY TIME-PHASED BUDGETS ESTAB-
LISHED FOR THIS PURPOSE. ONLY THAT EFFORT
WHICH CANNOT B£, IDENTIFIED AS DISCRETE,
SHORTSPAN WORK PACKAGES OR APPORTIONED





a. Are time-phased budgets established for planning
and control of level of effort activity by category of resource,
for example, type of manpower and/or material? (Explain
method of control and analysis.)
b. Is work properly classified as measured effort, LOE,
or apportioned effort and appropriately separated?
9. ESTABLISH OVERHEAD BUDGETS FOR THE
TOTAL COSTS OF EACH SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZA-
TIONAL COMPONENT WHOSE EXPENSES WILL BE-
COME INDIRECT COSTS. REFLECT IN THE CON-
TRACT BUDGETS AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL,
THE AMOUNTS IN OVERHEAD POOLS THAT WILL
BE ALLOCATED TO THE CONTRACT AS INDIRECT
COSTS. (Reference DCAA Audit Manual and ASPR-15-
203. (Reference format 7).
a. Are indirect budgets established on a facility-wide




b. Are the facility-wide indirect budgets updated in a
timely manner to reflect the realization or nonrealization of
potential business and/or changes in the planning base?
c. Are the indirect pools formally identified? (Provide
listing of pools.)
d. Are the facility-wide budgets identified to respon-
sible organizations and their associated indirect pool for
control purposes?
e. Are indirect budgets and costs properly classified?
f. Are the contractor's techniques for determining the
base and applicable rate for contract overhead budgets
acceptable? (Explain procedure.)
g. Does the contractor identify the level of the WBS
and organizational structure where indirect budgets are
controlled? (Identify levels.)
h. Do the indirect rates used to compute the contract
indirect cost estimates to complete properly reflect historical
experience, economic escalation and anticipated business
volume?
i. Are the procedures for determining facility-wide and
contract indirect budgets formally documented?




a. Are management reserves separately identified from
other budgets?
b. Are records maintained to show how management
reserves are used? (Provide exhibit.)
c. Are records maintained to show how undistributed
budgets are controlled? (Provide exhibit.)
11. PROVIDE THAT THE CONTRACT TARGET
COST PLUS THE ESTIMATED COST OF AUTHORIZED
BUT UNPRICED WORK IS RECONCILED WITH THE
SUM OF ALL INTERNAL CONTRACT BUDGETS AND






a. Do the sum of the cost account budgets and manage-
ment reserves reconcile with the contract target cost plus
the estimated cost for authorized unpriced work? (Provide
exhibit.)
III. ACCOUNTING
1. RECORD DIRECT COSTS ON AN APPLIED OR
OTHER ACCEPTABLE BASIS CONSISTENT WITH
THE BUDGETS IN A FORMAL SYSTEM THAT IS
CONTROLLED BY THE GENERAL BOOKS OF AC-
COUNT. WHERE AN APPLIED DIRECT COST BASIS
IS USED INCLUDE WITHIN THE COST ACCOUNTS
THE AMOUNTS CHARGED TO WORK IN PROCESS
IN THE TIME PERIOD WHEN: LABOR, MATERIAL,
AND OTHER DIRECT RESOURCES ARE ACTUALLY
CONSUMED; OR MATERIAL RESOURCES ARE WITH-
DRAWN FROM INVENTORY FOR USE; OR MATE-
RIAL RESOURCES ARE RECEIVED THAT ARE
UNIQUELY IDENTIFIED TO THE CONTRACT AND
SCHEDULED FOR USE WITHIN 60 DAYS; OR MAJOR
COMPONENTS OR ASSEMBLIES ARE RECEIVED ON
A LINE FLOW BASIS THAT ARE SPECIFICALLY AND
UNIQUELY IDENTIFIED TO A SINGLE SERIALLY
NUMBERED END ITEM.
a. Does the contractor use procedures for recording
direct costs of material which facilitate performance mea-
surement and determination of unit or lot costs when
applicable?
b. If the contractor uses applied direct cost basis for
material, do amounts charged to cost accounts for work in
progress reflect one or a combination of the time period
criteria defined above?
c. Does the accounting system provide a basis for audit-
ing records of applied (actual) direct costs and indirect
costs chargeable to the contract?
d. Are elements of cost (labor, material, etc.) separ-





2. FOR SOME APPLICATIONS, ACTUAL COSTS FOR
MATERIAL RECORDED OX OTHER THAN AN AP-
PLIED DIRECT COST BASIS MAY BE SELECTED.
WHEN USED, THE CONTRACTORS' MATERIAL AC-
i::::::::::::::i:i::i:::::i
COUNTING SYSTEM MUST FACILITATE PERFORM- :::::::::::::::::::::::::::
ANCE MEASUREMENT AND DETERMINATION OF
UNIT OR LOT COSTS WHEN APPLICABLE. THEY CRI'lLiLIA
MUST PROVIDE FOR: PRICE VARIANCE DETERMI-
NATION: USAGE VARIANCE DETERMINATION: AC-
CURATE COST ACCUMULATION AND ASSIGNMENT
OF COSTS TO COST ACCOUNTS IN A MANNER CON-
SISTENT WITH THE BUDGETS USING RECOGNIZED, \
ACCEPTABLE COSTING TECHNIQUES: AND MATE-
RIAL ACCOUNTABILITY.
a. Do the contractor's procedures for recording costs
facilitate performance measurement and determination of
unit or lot costs when applicable?
b. Does the contractor's system provide for material
price and usage variance determination?
c. Are material costs assigned to cost accounts and
accumulated in a mariner consistent with the budgets using
recognized acceptable costing techniques?
3. SUMMARIZE DIRECT COSTS FROM THE COST
ACCOUNTS INTO THE WBS WITHOUT ALLOCATION EHJCRITERTA!
OF A SINGLE COST ACCOUNT TO TWO OR MORE
WBS ELEMENTS. (Reference formats 3 and 5). :
a. Is it possible to summarize direct costs from the
cost account level through the WBS to the total contract
level without allocation of a lower level WBS element to
two or more higher level WBS elements? (This does not
preclude the allocation of costs from a cost account contain-
ing common items to appropriate using cost accounts.)
4. SUMMARIZE DIRECT COSTS FROM THE COST
ACCOUNTS INTO THE CONTRACTOR'S FUNCTIONAL
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE WITHOUT ALLOCA-
TION OF A SINGLE COST ACCOUNT TO TWO OR
MORE ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS. (Reference
formats 4 and 5.)
GRI'lJLHl y
a. Is it possible to summarize direct costs from the cost
account level to the highest functional organizational level
without allocation of a lower level organization's costs to
two or more higher level organizations?
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5. RECORD ALL INDIRECT COSTS WHICH WILL BE
ALLOCATED TO THE CONTRACT (REFERENCE
DCAA AUDIT MANUAL AND ASPR-15-203.)
^CRITERIA;
a. Does the cost accumulation system provide for sum-
marization of indirect costs from the point of allocation to
the contract total?
b. Are indirect costs, facility-wide and by contract,
accumulated so as to provide a basis for comparison between
planned and actual indirect costs?
c. Is the authority for incurring indirect costs com-
mensurate with responsibility for management control of
these costs? (Explain controls for fixed and variable in-
direct costs.)
d. Are indirect costs charged to the appropriate in-
direct pools and incurring organization?
e. Are the bases and rates (booking rates) for allocat-
ing costs from each indirect pool consistently applied?
f. Are the bases and rates (booking rates) for allocat-
ing costs from each indirect pool to commercial work con-
sistent with those used to allocate such costs to government
contracts?
g. Are the rates (booking rates) for allocating costs
from each indirect cost pool to contracts updated as neces-
sary to assure a realistic monthly allocation of indirect costs
without significant year end adjustments?
h. Is it possible to summarize indirect costs from the
point of allocation to the CWBS to the contract level with-
out allocation of two or more higher level elements?
i. Are the procedures for identifying indirect costs to
incurring organizations, indirect cost pools, and allocating
the costs from the pools to the contracts formally docu-
mented?
6. IDENTIFY THE BASES FOR ALLOCATING THE
COST OF APPORTIONED EFFORT.
a. Is apportioned effort directly related to discrete










b. Are methods used for applying apportioned effort
costs to cost accounts applied consistently and documented
in an established procedure?
c. Is effort which is appropriately planned and con-
trolled based on existing work packages identified as appor-
tioned effort?
7. IDENTIFY UNIT COSTS, EQUIVALENT UNIT
COSTS, OR LOT COSTS AS APPLICABLE.
JIHICRITERIA!
a. Does the contractor's system provide unit costs,
equivalent unit costs or lot costs in terms of labor, material
and other direct and indirect costs? (Describe procedure.)
IV. ANALYSIS
1. IDENTIFY AT THE COST ACCOUNT LEVEL ON
A MONTHLY BASIS USING DATA FROM, OR RECON-
CILABLE WITH, THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM: BCWS
AND BCWP; BCWP AND APPLIED (ACTUAL WHERE
APPROPRIATE) DIRECT COSTS FOR THE SAME
WORK; VARIANCES RESULTING FROM THE ABOVE
COMPARISONS CLASSIFIED IN TERMS OF LABOR,
MATERIAL, OR OTHER APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS,
TOGETHER WITH THE REASONS FOR SIGNIFICANT
VARIANCES.
EJiiJjCRITEIUA
a. Does the contractor's system include procedures for
measuring performance of the lowest level organization
responsible for performing work? (Provide typical example.)
b. Does the contractor measure cost and schedule per-
formance in a consistent, systematic manner?
c. Are the applied (actual) direct costs used for vari-
ance analysis reconcilable with data from the accounting
system ?
d. Is budgeted cost for work performed calculated in
a manner consistent with the way work is planned (for
example, if work is planned on a measured basis, budgeted
cost for work performed is calculated on a measured basis.)
e. Does the contractor have variance analysis pro-
cedures and a demonstrated capability for identifying (at
the cost account and other appropriate levels) cost and




(1) Identify and isolate problems causing unfavor-
able cost variances?
(2) Evaluate the impact of schedule changes, work
around, etc.?
(3) Evaluate the performance of operating organi-
zations?
(4) Identify potential or actual overruns and under-
runs?
2. IDENTIFY OX A MONTHLY BASIS IN THE DE-
TAIL NEEDED BY MANAGEMENT FOR EFFECTIVE
CONTROL, BUDGETED INDIRECT COSTS, ACTUAL
INDIRECT COSTS, AND VARIANCES ALONG WITH
THE REASONS THEREFOR.
iililj CRITERIA!
a. Are variances between budgeted and actual indirect
charges determined and analyzed at the level where res-
sponsibility for control of such costs is assigned (indirect
pool, department, etc.)?
b. Does the contractor's variance analysis capability
permit him to identify cost variances resulting from: (Pro-
vide example and relate to financial reports provided to
Government.)
(1) Changes in overhead rates?
(2) Changes in overhead base?
c. Is management corrective action taken to reduce
indirect costs where significant variances are noted?
3. SUMMARIZE THE DATA ELEMENTS AND ASSO-
CIATED VARIANCES LISTED IN ITEMS 1 AND 2
ABOVE THROUGH THE CONTRACTOR ORGANIZA-
TION AND WBS TO THE REPORTING LEVEL SPECI-
FIED IN THE CONTRACT. (Reference formats 2, 3, 4,
5, 10, and 11.)
!< FIT] ft I V
a. Are data elements (budgeted cost for work sched-
uled, budgeted cost for work performed, and actual cost)
progressively summarized from the detail level to the con-
tract level through the WBS? (Provide exhibit.)
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b. Are data elements summarized through the func-
tional organization structure for progressively higher levels
of management? (Provide exhibit.)
c. Are summarized data elements reconcilable between
internal summary reports and reports forwarded to the
Government.
d. Are procedures for variance analysis documented
and consistently applied at the cost account level and
selected WBS and organizational levels at least monthly as
a routine task? (Provide examples.)
4. IDENTIFY ON A MONTHLY BASIS SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PLANNED AND ACTUAL
SCHEDULE ACCOMPLISHMENT TOGETHER WITH
THE REASONS THEREFOR.
|i||| CRITERIA
a. Does the scheduling system identify work which is
behind schedule in a timely manner? (Provide representa-
tive examples.)
b. Does the contractor's system include the recording
of objective results, design reviews, and tests to provide
credible schedule information? (Provide examples.)
5. IDENTIFY MANAGERIAL ACTIONS TAKEN AS IIIIIJCRITERIA
A RESULT OF CRITERIA ITEMS 1 THRU 4 ABOVE.
a. Is timely and auditable data disseminated to the
contractor's managers? (Provide examples.)
b. Are data being used by managers in an effective
manner to ascertain program or functional status to identify
reasons for significant variances, and to initiate appropriate
corrective action. (Provide examples.)
c. Are there procedures for monitoring action items
and corrective actions to the point of resolution and are
these procedures being followed?
6. BASED ON PERFORMANCE TO DATE AND ON
ESTIMATES OF FUTURE CONDITIONS, DEVELOP
REVISED ESTIMATES OF COST AT COMPLETION
FOR WBS ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THE CON-
TRACT AND COMPARE THESE WITH THE CON-
TRACT BUDGET BASELINE AND THE LATEST
STATEMENT OF FUNDS REQUIREMENTS RE-




a. Are estimates of costs at completion based on per-
formance to date, actual costs to date, knowledgeable projec-
tions of future performance, and estimates of the cost for
contract work remaining to be accomplished?
b. Are estimates of costs at completion generated with
sufficient frequency to provide identification of future cost
problems in time for possible corrective or preventive
actions by both the contractor and the Government project
manager?
c. Are estimates of cost at completion generated for
the following levels:
(1) The program, as defined by the contractually
authorized work plus contractually specified options?
(Where the options include variable production lot quanti-
ties recurring revised estimates need only be generated for
median or nominal quantities.)
(2) Total contract (all authorized work)?
(3) WBS elements contractually specified for re-
porting of status to the Government (Lowest level only) ?
(4) Major subcontracts?
(5) Major functional areas of contract effort?
(6) Cost accounts?
d. Are the latest revised estimates of costs at comple-
tion at the appropriate levels compared with the following
items, and their causes identified
:
(1) Program ceiling price(s) by lot or option, if
applicable?
(2) Contract budget baseline?
e. Are estimates of costs at completion generated in a
rational, consistent manner? Are there procedures estab-
lished for appropriate aspects of generating estimates of
costs at completion?
f. Are estimates of costs at completion utilized in
determining contract funding requirements and reporting
them to the Government?
g. Are the contractor's estimates of costs at completion
reconcilable with cost data reported to the Government?
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V. REVISIONS AND ACCESS TO DATA
1. INCORPORATE CONTRACTUAL CHANGES IN A
TIMELY MANNER, RECORDING THE EFFECTS OF
SUCH CHANGES IN BUDGETS AND SCHEDULES. IN
THE DIRECTED EFFORT PRIOR TO NEGOTIATION
OF A CHANGE, BASE SUCH REVISIONS ON THE
AMOUNT ESTIMATED AND BUDGETED TO THE
FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
;;;;'::CRITERIA
a. Are authorized changes being incorporated in a
timely manner?
b. Are all affected work authorization, budgeting, and
scheduling documents amended to properly reflect the
effects of authorized changes? (Provide examples.)
c. Are internal budgets for authorized, but not priced
changes based on the contractor's resource plan for accom-
plishing the work?
£,. l\SL>\j\J~\\jli-.iU UrvXljriiNriij jD LlJvjrJL. J. O X"Urv J. Xj.vJo.Lj
ELEMENTS OF THE WBS IDENTIFIED AS PRICED
LINE ITEMS IN THE CONTRACT, AND FOR THOSE
ELEMENTS AT THE LOWEST LEVEL OF THE DOD
PROJECT SUMMARY WBS, WITH CURRENT PER-
FORMANCE BUDGETS IN TERMS OF CHANGES TO
THE AUTHORIZED WORK AND INTERNAL PREPLAN-
NING IN THE DETAIL NEEDED BY MANAGEMENT
FOR EFFECTIVE CONTROL. •
» CRITERIA
a. Are current budgets resulting from changes to the
authorized work and/or internal replanning, reconcilable to
original budgets for specified reporting items?
3. PROHIBIT RETROACTIVE CHANGES TO REC-
ORDS PERTAINING TO WORK PERFORMED THAT
WILL CHANGE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AMOUNTS
FOR DIRECT COSTS, INDIRECT COSTS, OR BUDGETS,




a. Are retroactive changes to direct costs, indirect
costs prohibited and avoided, except for the correction of
errors and routine accounting adjustments?
b. Are direct or indirect cost adjustments being accom-




c. Are retroactive changes to BCWS and BCWP pro-
hibited except for correction of errors or for reasons agreed
to by the contracting parties?
4. PREVENT REVISIONS TO THE CONTRACT
BUDGET BASELINE EXCEPT FOR "GOVERNMENT
DIRECTED CHANGES TO CONTRACTUAL EFFORT
OR CHANGES RESULTING FROM FORMAL PREPRO-
GRAMMING.
SiiiiiCRITERIA
a. Are procedures established to prevent changes to the
contract budget baseline (see definition) other than those
authorized by contractual action or formal reprogramming?
b. If interim budgets for authorized changes do not
equal negotiated cost for the changes, does the contractor
compensate for the differences with either management re-
serve or by revising interim budgets to equal the negotiated
cost?
.
5. CHANGES TO THE PERFORMANCE MEASURE-
MENT BASELINE WILL BE INTERNALLY DOCU-
MENTED. TIMELY NOTIFICATION OF THESE
CHANGES WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE PROCURING
ACTIVITY THRU PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES.
JiiyrCRITERM
a. Are changes to the performance measurement base-
line (cost account) made as a result of contractual redirec-
tion, formal reprogramming, or the use of management
reserve, properly documented and reflected in the Cost
Performance Report?
b. Is the procuring activity notified of internally gen-
erated changes to the performance measurement baseline in
a timely manner through an established procedure? (Ex-
plain procedures.)
c. Are procedures in existence that prevent changes to
budgets for open work packages and are these procedures
adhered to?
d. Are retroactive changes to budgets for completed
work specifically prohibited in an established procedure and
is this procedure adhered to?
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6. THE CONTRACTING OFFICER AND HIS DULY
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE PRO-
VIDED ACCESS TO ALL OF THE FOREGOING INFOR-
MATION AND RECORDS IN SUPPORT THEREOF.
||EmTERIA
a. Has the contractor provided access to all pertinent
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